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Abstract. In this paper we consider the class of truth-functional many-valued
logics with a finite set of truth-values. The main result of this paper is the de-
velopment of a new binary sequent calculi (each sequent is a pair of formulae)
for many valued logic with a finite set of truth values, and of Kripke-like seman-
tics for it that is both sound and complete. We did not use the logic entailment
based on matrix with a strict subset of designated truth values, but a different
new kind of semantics based on the generalization of the classic 2-valued truth-
invariance entailment. In order to define this non-matrix based sequent calculi,
we transform many-valued logic into positive 2-valued multi-modal logic with
classic conjunction, disjunction and finite set of modal connectives. In this al-
gebraic framework we define an uniquely determined axiom system, by extend-
ing the classic 2-valued distributive lattice logic (DLL) by a new set of sequent
axioms for many-valued logic connectives. Dually, in an autoreferential Kripke-
style framework we obtain a uniquely determined frame, where each possible
world is an equivalence class of Lindenbaum algebra for a many-valued logic as
well, represented by a truth value.
1 Introduction
A significant number of real-world applications in Artificial Intelligence has to deal
with partial, imprecise and uncertain information, and that is the principal reason for
introducing non-classic truth-functional many-valued logics, as for example, the fuzzy,
bilattice-based and paraconsistent logics, etc.. The first formal semantics for modal
logic was based on many-valuedness, proposed by Lukasiewicz in 1918-1920, and con-
solidated in 1953 in a 4-valued system of modal logic [1]. All cases of many-valued
logics mentioned above are based on a lattice (X,≤) of truth values.
Sequent calculus, introduced by Gentzen [2] and Hertz [3] for classical logic, was gen-
eralized to the many-valued case by Rouseau [4] and others. The tableaux calculi were
presented in [5,6]. The standard two-sides sequent calculi for lattice-based many-valued
logics has been elaborated recently (with an autoreferential Kripke-style semantics for
such logics) in two complementary ways in [7,8,9,10] as well.
In what follows we will consider, for a given logic language, with a set of ground for-
mulae (without variables) Ł, with a set of many-valued logic connectives in Σ and
predicate (or propositional) letters p, q, r, .., the truth-functional algebraic semantics. A
many-valued valuation v : Ł → X in this case is a homomorphism between the free
syntax-algebra of this logic language and the algebra (X,Σ) of truth-values. That is,
for any n-ary logic connective⊙ in Σ, ⊙ : Xn → X , it holds that v(⊙(φ1, ..., φn) =
⊙(v(φ1), ..., v(φn)), where φi ∈ Ł, 1 ≤ i ≤ n are logic formulae in Ł. Notice that there
is a non truth-functional many-valued semantic presented in [11] as well. It is based on
”nondeterministic” connectives ⊙˜ : Xn → 2X (whereAB denotes the set of functions
from B to A, and 2 = {0, 1} is a complete lattice of classical 2-valued logic) for each
ordinary connective ⊙ ∈ Σ, such that v(⊙(φ1, ..., φn) ∈ ⊙˜(v(φ1), ..., v(φn)), and so
called, Nmatrices (non-deterministic matrices). But in this case the compositional prop-
erty (the homomorphic property above) of a many-valued non-deterministic valuation
v is not valid. Thus, in what follows we will consider only the truth-functional many-
valued logics where the valuations are homomorphic.
The well-known semantics of the many-valued logics is based on algebraic matrices
(X,D) where D ⊂ X = {x1, ..., xm} is a strict subset of designated truth values,
so that a valuation v is a model for a formula φ ∈ Ł iff v(φ) ∈ D. This semantics
is commonly used in practice, particularly when the number of truth-values is limited.
As in the case of three-valued propositional logic, two different choices of the set of
designated values for the same semantics give respectively Kleene logic, and a basic
paraconsistent logic J3 -both quite important for mathematical logics itself and for its
applications.
The well known sequent system developed for such a many-valued logic with matrix-
based semantics is an ad hoc system based on m-sequents. based on standard matri-
ces. The more detailed information for interested readers can be found in [12,13]. But
such an approach, through absolutely correct and useful, has some little drawbacks, that
hopefully may be improved:
– It is much less known than those which are based on ordinary two-sided sequents.
The framework for two-sided sequent calculi is well-understood, and a lot of pro-
grams have been made towards developing their efficient implementations.
– The use of two-sided sequents reflects the basic fact that logic is all about conse-
quence relations, while in the m-sequent calculus only some characterization of the
consequence relation can be done in a roundabout way.
– The use of two-sided sequents is universal and independent of any particular seman-
tics, while the use of m-sequents relies in a particular way of a specific semantics
for a given logic.
Consequently, it is interesting to consider a calculus for many-valued logics based on
standard binary sequents. The previous work in this direction is recently proposed in
[14] based on m-valued Nmatrices, signed formulae and a Rasiowa-Sikorski deduction
system [15,16]. In the approach used in [14], an m-sequent calculus is transformed into
the ordinary two-sided sequent system (where each sequent is of the form Γ ⊢ △,
where Γ,△ ⊂ Ł are the finite subsets of logic formulae).
Notice that both sequent systems above are based on matrix semantics for logic entail-
ment. This is not our case: we will use the truth-invariance semantics for many-valued
logic [17] that is different from matrix-based semantics.
In this paper we propose this new approach to the semantics of many-valued logics by
transforming the original many-valued logic into the 2-valued multi-modal logic [18],
2
and then, based on the classical 2-valued distributive lattice logic (DLL) [19] extended
by a set of new axioms for this 2-valued transformation of many-valued logic, by ap-
plying Dunn’s binary-sequent approach. In the original Dunn,s approach each sequent
is of the simple form Φ ⊢ Ψ (here Φ and Ψ are the 2-valued multi-modal formulae) and,
consequently, his system is a particular sequent calculus where the left side of a sequent
is not generally a set of 2-valued formulae but a single formula. Another differences
between previous approaches and the approach used in this work are as follows:
– We will not use the many-valued Rosser-Turquette operators Jk [20] that have been
introduced a lot of time before the appearance of the Kripke semantics for algebraic
modal operators, and we will replace them by modal operators as follows: here we
will adopt the ontological encapsulation of many-valued logic into 2-valued multi-
modal logic [18] with algebraic modal operators [x] : X → 2 for any x ∈ X . In
what follows we will use [x] both as modal operator, i.e., a syntactic language entity
for modality ”heaving a truth-value x” (it express exactly the modality of truth of
the formula φ), and as a function on truth values, i.e., a semantic entity, which will
be clear from the particular context where [x] is used.
– We avoided to use the signed formulae used in [14]. In this way, by using modal
approach and its standard Kripke semantics, we are not obligated to develop an
unnecessary ad-hoc semantics for such a calculus as it will be shown in Section 4.
Notice that the main result of this work is the fact that we obtained a standard binary
sequent calculi for finite many-valued logic with the truth-invariance semantics of logic
entailment. Consequently, this work is not only another new reformulation of the same
many-valued inference system based on matrices, but is substantially new inference
system, different from the m-sequents and from the sequent calculi in [14] (that are
mutually equivalent). Such an approach we will apply to many-valued predicate logic
(without quantifiers), with the set of k-ary predicate letters in P , and to its particular
propositional case (where all predicate letters have 0-arity).
This paper follows the following plan:
After a brief introduction to the truth-invariance inference semantics, multi-modal pred-
icate logics (without quantifiers), and a short introduction to binary sequents and bival-
uations, in Section 2 we present the reduction of finite many-valued propositional (and
predicate) logic language Ł into the 2-valued multi-modal algebraic logic language ŁM .
Then we show the main properties for this positive logic (with standard 2-valued con-
junction and disjunction and a modal operator [x] for each truth value x in a finite
set X). We present a normal-forms reduction as well, where each obtained formula
has the modal operators applied only to propositional letters in Ł (atoms in predicate
logic with Herbrand base H). In Section 3 we develop the binary sequent system G, by
extending the classic 2-valued distributive lattice logic (DLL) with the set of sequent
axioms for each logic connective of a many-valued logic language Ł. We show that this
proof-theoretic sequent logic is sound and complete w.r.t. the model-theoretic seman-
tics, based on many-valued valuations: each deduced sequent from G and a given set of
sequent assumptions Γ is also a valid sequent (satisfied for every many-valued valua-
tion), and viceversa.
Finally in Section 4 we develop an autoreferential Kripke-style semantics, based on Lin-
denbaum algebra of a many-valued logic language Ł, and we define the Kripke frame
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for it with the set of possible worlds equal to the set of truth values X . Than we show
that this semantics is correct (sound and complete) for the multi-modal logic language
ŁM , that is, we demonstrate that for each many-valued algebraic model we obtain a
correspondent Kripke model, so that a formula true in ŁM is true in this Kripke model
as well, and viceversa.
In what follows we denote by BA the set of all functions from A to B, by An a n-fold
cartesian productA× ...×A for n ≥ 1, and by P(A) the set of all subsets of A.
1.1 Truth-invariance model-theoretic entailment
In the standard 2-valued model-theoretic semantics we say that a valuation v : Ł → 2
is a model of a sentence ψ ∈ Ł iff v(ψ) = 1 (here Ł denotes the set of all ground for-
mulae of a given logic language). Consequently, a formula φ is deduced from the set of
formulae Γ ⊆ Ł, denoted by Γ |=1 φ, iff ∀v ∈ModΓ .(v(φ) = 1), whereModΓ is the
set of all models of the formulae in Γ (here we use the index 1 ∈ 2 in the consequence
relation |=1 to indicate the deduction of the true formulae).
The set Γ can be formally constructed by a subset of formulae Γ1 that we want to be
(always) true, and by a subset of formulae Γ0 that we want to be (always) false, so that,
Γ = Γ1
⋃
{¬φ |φ ∈ Γ0 } where ¬ is the 2-valued negation operator (¬1 = 0,¬0 = 1).
What is not often underlined is that this standard 2-valued model-theoretic semantics
implicitly defines the set of false sentences deduced from Γ as well, denoted here ex-
plicitly by the new derived symbol |=0 for the deduction of false sentences (with the
index 0 ∈ 2), by: Γ |=0 φ iff Γ |=1 ¬φ, that is, iff ∀v ∈ModΓ .(v(φ) = 0).
Consequently, the classic 2-valued truth-invariance semantics of logic entailment can
be paraphrased by the following generalized entailment, denoted by Γ |= φ:
(CL) ”a formula φ is a logic consequence of the set Γ ” iff (∃x ∈ 2)(∀v ∈
ModΓ ).(v(φ) = x).
Thus, classic 2-valued entailment deduces both true and false sentences if they have
the same (i.e., invariant) truth-value in all models of Γ . The consequence relation |=1
defines Tarskian closure operator C : P(Ł) → P(Ł), such that C(Γ ) = {φ | φ ∈ Ł
and Γ |=1 φ}. In the 2-valued logics we do not need to use the consequence relation
|=0 because the set of false sentences deduced from Γ is equal to the set {¬φ | φ ∈ Ł
and Γ |=1 φ} = {¬φ | φ ∈ C(Γ )}. This particular property explains why in the classic
2-valued logic it is enough to consider only the consequence relation for deduction of
true sentences, or alternatively the Tarskian closure operator C.
But in the case of many-valued logics it is not generally the case, and we need the conse-
quence relations for the derivation of sentences that are not true as well. Consequently,
this classic 2-valued model-theoretic truth-invariance semantics of logic entailment we
will directly extend to many-valued logics by:
(MV) Γ |= φ iff (∃x ∈ X)(∀v ∈ModΓ ).(v(φ) = x),
where ModΓ is specified by prefixing a particular truth-value y ∈ X to each formula
ψ ∈ Γ , as we explained previously in the case of the 2-valued logic with two subsets
Γ1 and Γ0 for prefixed true and false sentences.
The matrix-based inference is different and specified by:
(MX) Γ |= φ iff (∀v ∈ModΓ,D).(v(φ) ∈ D),
with the set of models ModΓ,D of Γ defined as the set of valuations v such that
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(∀ψ ∈ Γ ).(v(ψ) ∈ D).
It is easy to verify that both semantics, the truth-invariance (MV) and the matrix-based
(MX), in the case of classic 2-valued logics, where D = {1}, coincide.
This new truth-invariance semantics of logic entailment for many-valued logics has
been presented first time in [17] and successively used for a new representation theo-
rem for many-valued modal logics [10].
1.2 Introduction to multi-modal predicate logic
More exhaustive and formal introduction to modal logics and their Kripke models can
be easily found in a literature, for example in [21]. Here will be given only a short
informal version, in order to make more clear definitions used in next paragraphs.
A predicate multi-modal logic, for a language with a set of predicate symbols r ∈ P
with arity ar(r) ≥ 0 and a set of functional symbols f ∈ F with arity ar(f) ≥ 0,
is a standard predicate logic extended by a finite number of universal modal operators
✷i, i ≥ 1. In this case we do not require that these universal modal operators are normal
(that is, monotonic and multiplicative) modal operators as in the standard setting for
modal logics, but we require that they have the same standard Kripke semantics. In the
standard Kripke semantics each modal operator✷i is defined by an accessibility binary
relationRi ⊆ W ×W for a given set of possible worlds W .
We define the set of terms of this predicate modal logic as follows: all variables x ∈
V ar, and constants d ∈ S are terms; if f ∈ F is a functional symbol of arity k = ar(f)
and t1, .., tk are terms, then f(t1, .., tk) is a term. We denote by T0 the set of all ground
(without variables) terms.
An atomic formula (atom) for a predicate symbol r ∈ P with arity k = ar(r) is an
expression r(t1, ..., tk), where ti, i = 1, ..., k are terms. Herbrand base H is a set of
all ground atoms (atoms without variables). More complex formulae, for a predicate
multi-modal logic, are obtained as a free algebra obtained from set of all atoms and
usual set of classic 2-valued binary logic connectives in {∧,∨,⇒} for conjunction,
disjunction and implication respectively (negation of a formula φ, denoted by ¬φ is
expressed by φ⇒ 0, where 0 is used for an inconsistent formula (has constantly value
0 for every valuation), and a number of unary universal modal operators ✷i. We define
N = {1, 2, ..., n} where n is the maximal arity of symbols in the finite set P
⋃
F .
Definition 1. We denote by M = (W , {Ri | 1 ≤ i ≤ k}, S, V ) a multi-modal Kripke
model with finite k ≥ 1 modal operators with a set of possible worlds W , the ac-
cessibility relations Ri ⊆ W × W , non empty set of individuals S, and a function
V :W × (P
⋃
F )→
⋃
n∈N (2
⋃
S)S
n
, such that for any world w ∈ W ,
1. For any functional letter f ∈ F , V (w, f) : Sar(f) → S is a function (interpretation
of f in w).
2. For any predicate letter r ∈ P , the function V (w, r) : Sar(r) → 2 defines the exten-
sion of r in a world w, ‖r‖ = {d =< d1, ..., dk >∈ Sk | k = ar(r), V (w, r)(d) = 1}.
We denote by M |=w,g ϕ the fact that a formula ϕ is satisfied in a world w ∈ W for
a given assignment g : V ar → S. For example, a given atom r(x1, ..., xk) is satisfied
in w by assignment g, i.e., M |=w,g r(x1, ..., xk), iff V (w, r)(g(x1), ..., g(xk)) = 1.
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The Kripke semantics is extended to all formuale as follows:
M |=w,g ϕ ∧ φ iff M |=w,g ϕ and M |=w,g φ ,
M |=w,g ϕ ∨ φ iff M |=w,g ϕ or M |=w,g φ ,
M |=w,g ϕ⇒ φ iff M |=w,g ϕ implies M |=w,g φ ,
M |=w,g ✷iϕ iff ∀w′((w,w′) ∈ Ri implies M |=w′,g ϕ ) .
The existential modal operator♦i can be defined as a derived operator by taking ¬✷i¬.
A formula ϕ is said to be true in a model M if for each assignment function g and
possible world w, M |=w,g ϕ. A formula is said to be valid if it is true in each model.
We denote by ‖φ/g‖ = {w | M} |=w,g φ} the set of all worlds where the ground
formula φ/g (obtained from φ and an assignment g) is satisfied.
Remark: in this paper we will use the notation [x] (for any truth value x ∈ X) for
universal modal operators, instead of standard notation ✷i.
1.3 Introduction to binary sequents and bivaluations
Sequent calculus has been developed by Gentzen [2], inspired on ideas of Paul Hertz
[3]. Given a propositional logic language ŁA (a set of logic formulae) a sequent is a
consequence pair of formulae, s = (φ;ψ) ∈ ŁA × ŁA, denoted also by φ ⊢ ψ.
A Gentzen system, denoted by a pair G = 〈L,〉 where  is a consequence relation on
a set of sequents in L ⊆ ŁA×ŁA, is said normal if it satisfies the following conditions:
for any sequent s = φ ⊢ ψ ∈ L and a set of sequents Γ = {si = φi ⊢ ψi ∈ L | i ∈ I},
1. (reflexivity) if s ∈ Γ then Γ  s
2. (transitivity) if Γ  s and for every s′ ∈ Γ , Θ  s′, then Θ  s
3. (finiteness) if Γ  s then there is finite Θ ⊆ Γ such that Θ  s.
4. for any homomorphism σ from L into itself (i.e., a substitution), if Γ  s then
σ[Γ ]  σ(s), i.e., {σ(φi) ⊢ σ(ψi) | i ∈ I}  (σ(φ) ⊢ σ(ψ)).
Notice that from (1) and (2) we obtain this monotonic property:
5. if Γ  s and Γ ⊆ Θ, then Θ  s.
We denote by C : P(L) → P(L) the Tarskian closure operator such that C(Γ ) =def
{s ∈ L | Γ  s}, with the properties: Γ ⊆ C(Γ ) (from reflexivity (1)); it is monotonic,
i.e., Γ ⊆ Γ1 implies C(Γ ) ⊆ C(Γ1) (from (5)), and an involution C(C(Γ )) = C(Γ )
as well. Thus, we obtain that
6. Γ  s iff s ∈ C(Γ ).
Any sequent theory Γ ⊆ L is said a closed theory iff Γ = C(Γ ). This closure property
corresponds to the fact that Γ  s iff s ∈ Γ .
Each sequent theory Γ can be considered as a bivaluation (a characteristic function)
β : L→ 2 such that for any sequent s ∈ L, β(s) = 1 iff s ∈ Γ .
2 Reduction of finite many-valued into 2-valued multi-modal logic
In what follows let ŁP be a predicate logic language obtained as a free algebra, from
connectives in Σ of an algebra with a set X of truth values (for example the many-
valued conjunction, disjunction and implication {∧m,∨m,⇒m} ⊆ Σ are binary op-
erators, negation ¬m ∈ Σ and other modal operators are unary operators, while each
x ∈ X ⊆ Σ is a constant (nullary operator)), a set P of predicate symbols denoted by
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p, r, q, .. with a given arity (in the case when the arity of all symbols in P is a zero we
obtain that P is the set of propositional variables (letters), so that ŁP is a propositional
logic), and a set F of functional symbols (with a given arity) denoted by f, g, h..
We define the set of terms of this logic as follows: all variables νi ∈ V ar, i = 1, 2, ...,
and constants d ∈ S are terms; if f ∈ F is a functional symbol of arity n and t1, .., tn
are terms, then f(t1, .., tn) is a term. The ground term is a term without variables. We
denote by TS a set of all terms.
The set of atoms is defined as AS = {p(c1, .., cn) | p ∈ P, n = arity(p) and
ci ∈ TS}. The set of all ground atoms (without variables), H = {p(c1/g, .., cn/g) | p ∈
P, n = arity(p) , ci ∈ TS and g : V ar → S}, is a Herbrand base (here ci/g denotes
a ground atom obtained from a term ci by an assignment g).
Any atom is a logic formulae. The combination of logic formulae by logical connec-
tives in Σ is another logic formula.
We will denote by Ł the subset of the logic language ŁP composed of only ground
formulae. In this case we can nominate each ground atom by a particular propositional
letter, so that this logic language Ł is equivalent to the propositional logic language
where the ground atoms in H ⊆ Ł are replaced by propositional letters A,B, ...
We will use the letters φ, ψ for formulae of Ł.
We define a (many-valued) valuation v as a mapping v : H → X , which is uniquely
extended in standard way to the homomorphism v : Ł → X (for example, for any
A,B ∈ H , v(A⊙B) = v(A)⊙ v(B),⊙ ∈ {∧m,∨m,⇒m} and v(¬mA) = ¬mv(A),
where∧m,∨m,⇒m,¬m are the many-valued conjunction, disjunction, implication and
negation respectively). The set of all many-valued valuations is a strict subset Vm of
the functional space XŁ that satisfies the homomorphic conditions above.
Based on this propositional many-valued logic language Ł we are able to define the
following multi-modal 2-valued algebraic logic language Ł∗M , by introduction [18] of
modal non-standard (non monotonic) algebraic truth-functional operators [x] : Y → 2,
where Y = X
⋃
2, such that for any x, y ∈ Y , [x](y) = 1 iff x = y. The intersec-
tion of X and 2 can be non empty as well.
The set of truth values X is a finite set, so that the number of these algebraic modal
operators n = |Y | ≥ 2 is finite as well (|Y | is the cardinality of the set Y ).
Definition 2. SYNTAX: Let ŁP be a predicate many-valued logic language with a set
of truth values X and (2,∧,∨) the complete distributive two-valued lattice. The multi-
modal 2-valued logic language Ł∗M , is the set of all modal formulae (we will use letters
Φ, Ψ.. for the formulae of Ł∗M ) defined as follows:
1. 2 ⊆ Ł∗M .
2. [x]φ ∈ Ł∗M , for any x ∈ X,φ ∈ ŁP .
3. [x]Φ ∈ Ł∗M , for any x ∈ 2, Φ ∈ Ł∗M .
4. Φ, Ψ ∈ Ł∗M implies Φ ∧ Ψ, Φ ∨ Ψ ∈ Ł∗M .
We denote by ŁM the sublanguage of Ł∗M without variables (ground atoms in ŁM are
considered as propositional letters).
The constants 0, 1 correspond to the tautology and contradiction proposition respec-
tively, and can be considered as nullary operators in ŁM .
We can use this 2-valued multi-modal logic language ŁM in order to define the sequents
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as elements of the cartesian product ŁM × ŁM , i.e., each sequent s, denoted by Φ ⊢ Ψ ,
where Φ, Ψ ∈ ŁM .
Definition 3. SEMANTICS: For any many-valued valuation v ∈ Vm, v : Ł → X , we
define the ’modal valuation’ α : ŁM → 2 as follows:
1. α(0) = 0, α(1) = 1.
2. α([x]φ) = 1 iff x = v(φ), for any x ∈ X , φ ∈ Ł.
3. α([x]Φ) = 1 iff x = α(Φ), for any x ∈ 2, Φ ∈ ŁM .
4. α(Φ ∧ Ψ) = α(Φ) ∧ α(Ψ), α(Φ ∨ Ψ) = α(Φ) ∨ α(Ψ), for any Φ, Ψ ∈ ŁM .
This transformation from many-valued valuations into modal valuatins can be expressed
by the mapping F : Vm → V , where V ⊂ 2ŁM denotes the set of all modal valuations.
It is easy to verify that the mapping F is a bijection, with its inverse F−1 defined as
follows: for any modal valuation α ∈ V , given in Definition 3, we have that the many-
valued valuation v = F−1(α) : Ł → X is defined for any φ ∈ Ł, by v(φ) = x ∈ X
iff α([x]φ) = 1.
A many-valued valuation v : Ł → X , v ∈ Vm, satisfies a 2-valued multi-modal for-
mula Φ ∈ ŁM iff F(v)(Φ) = 1.
Given two formulaeΦ, Ψ ∈ ŁM , the sequentΦ ⊢ Ψ is satisfied by v if F(v)(Φ) ≤ F(v)(Ψ).
A sequent Φ ⊢ Ψ is an axiom if it is satisfied by every valuation v ∈ Vm ⊂ XŁ.
From this definition of satisfaction for sequents we obtain the reflexivity (axiom)Φ ⊢ Φ
and transitivity (cut) inference rule, i.e., from Φ ⊢ Ψ and Ψ ⊢ Υ we deduce Φ ⊢ Υ .
Let us define the set of 2-valued multi-modal literals (or modal atoms),
Pmm = {[x1]...[xk]A ∈ ŁM | k ≥ 1 and A ∈ H}.
For example, if v(φ) = x then F(v)([1][x]φ) = 1, while if v(φ) 6= x then F(v)([0][x]φ)
= 1. Notice that the number of nested modal operators can be reduced from the fact that
[0][0] and [1][1] are identities for the formulae in ŁM . For example, for [x]φ ∈ ŁM , we
have [0][1][1][0][x]φ ≡ [0][0][x]φ ≡ [x]φ, where ≡ is a standard logic equivalence.
Then, given a formula φ ∈ Ł, we have that the modal formula [x]φ ∈ ŁM can be
naturally reduced into an equivalent formula, denoted by [̂x]φ, where the modal oper-
ators [x] are applied only to ground atoms (considered as propositional letters) in H .
Moreover, for any formula Φ ∈ ŁM there is an equivalent formula Φ̂ composed by log-
ical connectives ∧, ∨, and by multi-modal literals in Pmm. A canonical formula can be
obtained by the following reduction:
Definition 4. CANONICAL REDUCTION: Let us define the following reduction rules:
1. For any unary operator ∼∈ Σ, φ ∈ Ł, and a value x ∈ X ,
[x](∼ φ) 7→
∨
y∈X. x=∼y[y]φ,
2. For any binary operator ⊙ ∈ Σ, φ, ψ ∈ Ł, and a value x ∈ X ,
[x](φ ⊙ ψ) 7→
∨
y,z∈X. x=y⊙z([y]φ ∧ [z]ψ).
3. For any binary operator ⊙ ∈ {∧,∨}, Φ, Ψ ∈ ŁM , and a value x ∈ 2,
[x](Φ ⊙ Ψ) 7→
∨
y,z∈ 2. x=y⊙z([y]Φ ∧ [z]Ψ).
We denote by [̂x]Φ the canonic formula obtained by applying recursively these reduc-
tion rules to the formula [x]Φ.
Proposition 1 The normal reductions in Definition 4 are truth-preserving, that is, for
any x ∈ X and φ ∈ Ł we have that [x]φ is logically equivalent to [̂x]φ.
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Analogously, for any x ∈ 2 and Φ ∈ ŁM we have that [x]Φ is logically equivalent to
[̂x]Φ.
Proof: Let us show that the steps of canonical reduction in Definition 4 are truth-
preserving:
1. The first case of reduction: let us suppose that [x](∼ φ) is true but
∨
y∈X.x=∼y[y]φ
is false. From the truth of [x](∼ φ) we obtain that x = v(∼ φ): let z = v(φ) and,
consequently, [z]φ is true, then, from the truth-functional connective ∼ we conclude
that x =∼ z and from the fact that [z]φ is true, we conclude that
∨
y∈X.x=∼y[y]φ must
be true, which is a contradiction. Consequently [x](∼ φ) implies
∨
y∈X.x=∼y[y]φ.
Viceversa, if
∨
y∈X.x=∼y[y]φ is true then there exists z such that [z]φ is true, with
x =∼ z, i.e., x = v(∼ φ) so that [x](∼ φ) is true.
Consequently, [x](∼ φ) iff
∨
y∈X.x=∼y[y]φ.
2. Analogously, for the second case (and 3rd as well) we obtain that
[x](φ ⊙ ψ) iff
∨
y∈X.x=y⊙z([y]φ ∧ [z]ψ).
From the fact that both steps are also truth-preserving, we deduce that any consecutive
execution of them is truth-preserving, and, consequently, [x]φ iff [̂x]φ.

The following proposition shows that the result of the canonical reduction of a formula
Φ ∈ ŁM is a disjunction of modal conjunctions, which in the case of the formulae
without nested modal operators is a simple disjunctive modal formula.
Proposition 2 Any 2-valued logic formulae Φ ∈ ŁM is logically equivalent to disjunc-
tive modal formula ∨1≤i≤m(
∧
1≤j≤mi
([yij1]...[yijkij ])Aij), where for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m,
and 1 ≤ j ≤ mi, we have that 1 ≤ kij , [yijkij ] ∈ X , and Aij ∈ H .
In the case when we have no nested modal operators then kij = 1 for all i, j. Conse-
quently, Φ ∈ ŁM is logically equivalent to a disjunctive modal formula
∨
1≤i≤m[xi]φi,
where for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m, xi ∈ X , φi ∈ Ł.
Proof: From Proposition 1 and from the canonical reduction in Definition 4, it is
easy to see that each logically equivalent reduction moves a modal operator toward
propositional letters in H , by introduction of conjunction and disjunction logic op-
erators only. Thus, when this reduction is completely realized we obtain a positive
propositional logic formula with modal propositions in Pmm and logic operators ∧
and ∨. It is well known that such a positive propositional formula can be equivalently
(but not uniquely) represented as a disjunction of conjunctions of modal propositions
([yij1]...[yijkij ])Aij ∈ Pmm.
Let us consider now a formula Φ ∈ ŁM without nested modal operators. Then kij = 1
for all i, j and, from the result above, a formula Φ ∈ ŁM can be equivalently (but not
uniquely) represented as a disjunction of conjunctive forms ∨1≤i≤m(
∧
1≤j≤mi
[yij1]Aij).
But, we have that
∧
1≤j≤mi
[yij1]Aij = [xi]φi, where for any binary operator ⊙ ∈ Σ,
xi = yi11 ⊙ ... ⊙ yimi1 ∈ X , and φi = Ai1 ⊙ ... ⊙ Aimi ∈ Ł. It holds because
α([xi]φi) = 1 iff xi = v(φi) = v(Ai1 ⊙ ... ⊙ Aimi) = v(Ai1) ⊙ ... ⊙ v(Aimi) =
yi11 ⊙ ...⊙ yimi1.
That is, we obtain that holds: Φ iff
∨
1≤i≤m[xi]φi.

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With this normal reduction, by using truth-value tables of many-valued logical con-
nectives, we introduced the structural compositionality and truth preserving for the 2-
valued modal encapsulation of a many-valued logic Ł as well. In fact, the following
property is valid:
Proposition 3 Given a many-valued valuation v : Ł → X and a formula φ ∈ Ł, the
normal reduct formula [̂x]φ ∈ ŁM is satisfied by v iff x = v(φ).
Proof: By structural induction on φ: let α = F(v), then
1. Case when φ = A ∈ H :
If [̂x]A is satisfied than α([̂x]φ) = α([x]A) = 1 (from Definition 3 and Proposition 1),
thus x = v(A) = v(φ).
2. Case when φ =∼ ψ, where∼ is an unary operator inΣ, with y = v(ψ) and x =∼ y:
Suppose, by structural induction, that [̂y]ψ is satisfied, i.e., y = v(ψ), so that [y]ψ is
true (from Definition 3). Thus, ∨y∈X.x=∼y[y]ψ is true and, by the truth-preservation
(from the reduction 1 in Definition 4) we obtain that [x](∼ ψ) is true, so that, [x]φ
is true, i.e., (by Definition 3) x = v(φ), and (from Proposition 1) [̂x]φ is true. With
x =∼ y =∼ (v(ψ)) = (from the homomorphism of v) = v(∼ ψ) = v(φ).
3. Case when φ = ψ ⊙ ϕ, where⊙ is a binary operator in Σ, with y = v(ψ), z = v(ϕ)
and x = y ⊙ z:
Then, by structural induction hypothesis, [̂y]ψ and [̂z]ϕ are satisfied, so that from Propo-
sition 1 and Definition 3 we have that 1 = α([̂y]ψ) = α([y]ψ) and 1 = α([̂z]ϕ) =
α([z]ϕ). Consequently, 1 = α([y]ψ) ∧ α([z]ϕ) = (from the homomorphism 2 in Def-
inition 3) = α([y]ψ ∧ [z]ϕ) = α(∨y∈X.x=y⊙z([y]ψ ∧ [z]ϕ)) = (from the reduction 2
in Definition 4) = α([x](ψ ⊙ ϕ)) = α([x]φ) = (by Proposition 1) = α([̂x]φ). Thus,
[̂x]φ is satisfied by v and x = y ⊙ z = v(ψ)⊙ v(ϕ) = (from the homomorphism of v)
= v(ψ ⊙ ϕ) = v(φ).

Thus, as a consequence, for any φ ∈ Ł and a many-valued valuation v ∈ Vm, we have
that F(v)([̂x]φ) = 1 iff x = v(φ).
3 Many-valued truth and model theoretic semantics
The Gentzen-like system G of the 2-valued propositional logic ŁM (where the set of
propositional letters corresponds to the set Pmm = {[x1]...[xk]A ∈ ŁM | k ≥ 1 and
A ∈ H}, is a 2-valued distributive logic (DLL in [19]), that is, 2 ⊆ ŁM , extended by
the set of sequent axioms, defined for each many-valued logic connective in Σ of the
original many-valued logic Ł. It contains the following axioms (sequents) and rules:
(AXIOMS) The Gentzen-like system G = 〈L,〉 contains the following sequents in
L, for any Φ, Ψ, Υ ∈ ŁM :
1. Φ ⊢ Φ (reflexive)
2. Φ ⊢ 1, 0 ⊢ Φ (top/bottom axioms)
3. Φ ∧ Ψ ⊢ Φ, Φ ∧ Ψ ⊢ Ψ (product projections: axioms for meet)
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4. Φ ⊢ Φ ∨ Ψ , Φ ⊢ Ψ ∨ Φ (coproduct injections: axioms for join)
5. Φ ∧ (Ψ ∨ Υ ) ⊢ (Φ ∧ Ψ) ∨ (Φ ∧ Υ ) (distributivity axiom)
6. The set of Introduction axioms for many-valued connectives:
6.1
∨
y,z∈ 2. x1=y⊙z([y]Φ∧[z]Ψ) ⊢ [x1](Φ⊙Ψ), for any binary operator ⊙ ∈ {∧,∨}.
6.2
∨
y∈X.x=∼y[y]φ ⊢ [x](∼ φ), for any unary operator ∼∈ Σ and φ ∈ Ł.
6.3
∨
y,z∈X.x=y⊙z([y]φ ∧ [z]ψ) ⊢ [x](φ ⊙ ψ), for any binary operator ⊙ ∈ Σ and
φ, ψ ∈ Ł.
7. The set of Elimintion axioms for many-valued connectives:
7.1 [x1](Φ⊙Ψ) ⊢
∨
y,z∈ 2. x1=y⊙z([y]Φ∧[z]Ψ), for any binary operator ⊙ ∈ {∧,∨}.
7.2 [x](∼ φ) ⊢
∨
y∈X.x=∼y[y]φ, for any unary operator ∼∈ Σ and φ ∈ Ł.
7.3 [x](φ ⊙ ψ) ⊢
∨
y,z∈X.x=y⊙z([y]φ ∧ [z]ψ), for any binary operator ⊙ ∈ Σ and
φ, ψ ∈ Ł.
(INFERENCE RULES) G is closed under the following inference rules:
1. Φ ⊢Ψ, Ψ ⊢ΥΦ ⊢Υ (cut/ transitivity rule)
2. Φ ⊢Ψ, Φ ⊢ΥΦ ⊢Ψ∧Υ ,
Φ ⊢Ψ, Υ ⊢Ψ
Φ∨Υ ⊢Ψ (lower/upper lattice bound rules)
3. Φ ⊢Ψσ(Φ) ⊢σ(Ψ) (substitution rule: σ is substitution (γ/p)).

The axioms from 1 to 5 and the rules 1 and 2 are taken from [19] for the DLL and
it was shown that this sequent based Genzen-like system is sound and complete. The
new axioms in points 6 and 7 corresponds to the canonical (equivalent) reductions in
Definition 4. The set of sequents that define the poset of the classic 2-valued lattice of
truth values (2,≤) is a consequence of the top/bottom axioms: for any two x, y ∈ 2, if
x ≤ y then x ⊢ y ∈ G.
Thus, for many-valued logics we obtain a normal modal Gentzen-like deductive system,
where each sequent is a valid truth-preserving consequence-pair defined by the poset of
the complete lattice (2,≤) of classic truth values (which are also the constants of this
positive propositional language ŁM ), so that each occurrence of the symbol ⊢ can be
substituted by the partial order ≤ of this complete lattice (2,≤) .
Example 1: Let us consider the Godel’s 3-valued logicX = {0, 12 , 1}, and its 3-valued
implication logic connective⇒ given by the following truth-table:
⇒ 0 12 1
0 1 1 1
1
2 0 1 1
1 0 12 1
One of the possible m-sequents for introduction rules for this connective, taken from
[12], (each rule corresponds to the conjunction of disjunctive forms, where each dis-
junctive form is one m-sequent in the premise), is
〈Γ |△,φ|Π,φ〉 〈Γ1,ψ|△1|Π1〉
〈Γ,Γ1,φ⇒ψ|△,△1|Π,Π1〉
⇒: 0, 〈Γ |△|Π,φ〉 〈Γ1|△1,ψ|Π1〉〈Γ,Γ1,|△,△1,φ⇒ψ|Π,Π1〉 ⇒:
1
2
〈Γ,φ|△,φ|Π,ψ〉 〈Γ1,φ|△1,ψ|Π1,ψ〉
〈Γ,Γ1,|△,△1|Π,Π1,φ⇒ψ〉
⇒: 1
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while in our approach we obtain the unique set of binary sequent introduction axioms:
([ 12 ]φ ∧ [0]ψ) ∨ ([1]φ ∧ [0]ψ) ⊢ [0](φ⇒ ψ)
[1]φ ∧ [ 12 ]ψ ⊢ [
1
2 ](φ⇒ ψ)∨
x,y∈X & (x,y)/∈ S ([x]φ ∧ [y]ψ) ⊢ [1](φ⇒ ψ)
where S = {(12 , 0), (1, 0), (1,
1
2 )},
and elimination axioms:
[0](φ⇒ ψ) ⊢ ([ 12 ]φ ∧ [0]ψ) ∨ ([1]φ ∧ [0]ψ)
[ 12 ](φ⇒ ψ) ⊢ [1]φ ∧ [
1
2 ]ψ
[1](φ⇒ ψ) ⊢
∨
x,y∈X & (x,y)/∈ S ([x]φ ∧ [y]ψ).

Definition 5. For any two formulae Φ, Ψ ∈ ŁM when the sequent Φ ⊢ Ψ is satisfied by
a 2-valued modal valuationα : ŁM → 2 from Definition 3 (that is, when α(Φ) ≤ α(Ψ)
as in standard 2-valued logics), we say that it is satisfied by the many-valued valuation
v = F−1(α) : Ł → X .
This sequent is a tautology if it is satisfied by all modal valuations α ∈ V , i.e., when
∀v ∈ Vm.(F(v)(Φ) ≤ F(v)(Ψ)).
For a normal Gentzen-like sequent system G = 〈L,〉 of a many-valued logic language
Ł, with the set of sequents L ⊆ ŁM × ŁM , we tell that a many-valued valuation v is its
model if it satisfies all sequents in G.
The set of all models of a given set of sequents (theory) Γ is:
ModΓ = {v ∈ Vm | ∀(Φ ⊢ Ψ) ∈ Γ (F(v)(Φ) ≤ F(v)(Ψ))} ⊆ Vm ⊂ XŁ.
Proposition 4 SEQUENT’S BIVALUATIONS AND SOUNDNESS: Let us define the map-
ping B : Vm → 2ŁM×ŁM from valuations into sequent bivaluations, such that for any
valuation v ∈ Vm we obtain the sequent bivaluation β = B(v) = eq◦ < pi1,∧ >
◦(F(v) × F(v)) : ŁM × ŁM → 2, where pi1 is the first projection, ◦ is the functional
composition and eq : 2 × 2 → 2 is the equality mapping such that eq(x, y) = 1 iff
x = y.
Than, a sequent s = (Φ ⊢ Ψ) is satisfied by v iff β(s) = B(v)(s) = 1.
All axioms of the Gentzen like sequent system G, of a many-valued logic language Ł
based on a set X of truth values, are the tautologies, and all its rules are sound for
model satisfiability and preserve the tautologies.
Proof: From the definition of a bivaluation β we have that
β(Φ ⊢ Ψ) = β(Φ;Ψ) = eq◦ < pi1,∧ > ◦(F(v)× F(v))(Φ;Ψ)
= eq◦ < pi1,∧ > (F(v)(Φ) × F(v)(Ψ))
= eq < pi1(F(v)(Φ),F(v)(Ψ)), ∧(F(v)(Φ),F(v)(Ψ)) >
= eq(F(v)(Φ), F(v)(Φ) ∧ F(v)(Ψ)).
Thus β(Φ ⊢ Ψ) = 1 iff F(v)(Φ) ≤ F(v)(Ψ), i.e., when this sequent is satisfied by v.
It is straightforward to check that all axioms in G are tautologies (all constant sequents
specify the poset of the complete lattice (2,≤) of classic 2-valued logic, thus are tau-
tologies). It is straightforward to check that all rules preserve the tautologies. More-
over, if all premises of a given rule in G are satisfied by a given many-valued valuation
v : Ł → X , then also the deduced sequent of this rule is satisfied by the same valuation,
12
i.e., the rules are sound for the model satisfiability.

It is easy to verify, that this entailment is equal to the classic propositional entailment.
Remark: It is easy to observe that each sequent is, from the logic point of view, a
2-valued object so that all inference rules are embedded into the classic 2-valued frame-
work, i.e., given a bivaluation β = B(v) : ŁM × ŁM → 2, we have that a sequent
s = Φ ⊢ Ψ is satisfied, β(s) = 1 iff F(v)(Φ) ≤ F(v)(Ψ), so that we have the direct
relationship between sequent bivaluations β and many-valued valuations v.
This sequent feature, which is only an alternative formulation for the 2-valued classic
logic, is fundamental in the framework of many-valued logics where the semantics for
the entailment based on the algebraic matrices (X,D) is often subjective and arbitrary.
Let us consider, for example, the fuzzy logic with the uniquely fixed semantics for all
logical connectives, where the subset of designated elements D ⊆ X is an arbitrary-
subjective choice between the infinite number of closed intervals [a, 1] also for very
restricted interval, for example, 0.83 ≤ a ≤ 0.831. It does not happen in the classic
2-valued logics where a different logic semantics (entailment) is obtained by adopting
only different semantics for some of its logical connectives, usually for negation opera-
tor. This property of the classic 2-valued logic can be propagated to many-valued logics
by adopting the principle of classic truth-invariance for the entailment: in that case for
fixed semantics of all logical connectives of a given language we obtain a unique logic.
The definition of the 2-valued entailment in the sequent system G, given in Definition 5,
can replace the current entailment based on algebraic matrices (X,D) where D ⊆ X
is a subset of designated elements. Thus, we are able now to introduce the many-valued
valuation-based (i.e., model-theoretic) semantics for many-valued logics:
Definition 6. [8] A many-valuedmodel-theoretic semantics of a given many-valued
logic Ł, with a Gentzen system G = 〈L,〉, is the semantic deducibility relation |=m ,
defined for any Γ = {si = (Φi ⊢ Ψi) | i ∈ I} and a sequent s = (Φ ⊢ Ψ) ∈ L ⊆
ŁM × ŁM by :
Γ |=m s iff ”all many-valued models of Γ are the models of s”, that is,
iff ∀v ∈ Vm( ∀(Φi ⊢ Ψi) ∈ Γ (F(v)(Φi) ≤ F(v)(Ψi) implies F(v)(Φ) ≤ F(v)(Ψ)).
Lemma 1. For any Γ = {si = (Φi ⊢ Ψi) | i ∈ I} and a sequent s = (Φ ⊢ Ψ) we
have that Γ |=m s iff ∀v ∈ModΓ ( B(v)(s) = 1).
Proof: We have that Γ |=m s iff
∀v ∈ Vm( ∀(Φi ⊢ Ψi) ∈ Γ (F(v)(Φi) ≤ F(v)(Ψi) implies F(v)(Φ) ≤ F(v)(Ψ))
iff ∀v ∈ ModΓ ( ∀(Φi ⊢ Ψi) ∈ Γ (F(v)(Φi) ≤ F(v)(Ψi) implies F(v)(Φ) ≤
F(v)(Ψ))
iff ∀v ∈ModΓ ( F(v)(Φ) ≤ F(v)(Ψ))
iff ∀v ∈ModΓ ( B(v)(s) = 1).

It is easy to verify that any many-valued logic has a Gentzen-like system G = 〈L,〉
(see the definition at the begining of this Section) that is a normal logic.
Theorem 1 Many-valued model theoretic semantics is an adequate semantics for a
many-valued logic Ł specified by a Gentzen-like logic system G = 〈L,〉, that is, it is
sound and complete. Consequently, Γ |=m s iff Γ  s.
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Proof: Let us prove that for any many valued model v ∈ ModΓ , the obtained sequent
bivaluation β = B(v) : ŁM × ŁM → 2 is the characteristic function of the closed
theory Γv = C(T ) with T = {Φ ⊢ 1, 1 ⊢ Φ | Φ ∈ Pmm, F(v)(Φ) = 1}
⋃
{Φ ⊢
0, 0 ⊢ Φ | Φ ∈ Pmm, F(v)(Φ) = 0}.
1. Let us show that for any sequent s, s ∈ Γv implies β(s) = 1:
First of all, for any sequent s ∈ T we have that: if it is of the form Φ ⊢ 1 or 1 ⊢ Φ
(where Φ ∈ Pmm) we have that F(v)(Φ) = 1, thus s is satisfied by v (it holds that
1 ≤ 1 in both cases); if it is of the form Φ ⊢ 0 or 0 ⊢ Φ we have that F(v)(Φ) = 0,
thus s is satisfied by v (it holds that 0 ≤ 0 in both cases). Consequently, all sequents in
T are satisfied by v.
From Proposition 4 we have that all inference rules in G are sound w.r.t. the model sat-
isfiability. Thus for any deduction T  s (i.e., s ∈ Γv) where all sequents in premises
are satisfied by the many-valued valuation (model) v, the deduced sequent s = (Φ ⊢ Ψ)
must be satisfied as well, that is, it must hold that F(v)(Φ) ≤ F(v)(Ψ), i.e., β(s) = 1.
2. Let us show that for any sequent s, β(s) = 1 implies s ∈ Γv: For any sequent
s = (Φ ⊢ Ψ) ∈ ŁM × ŁM if β(s) = 1 we have one of the two possible cases:
2.1 Case when F(v)(Φ) = 0. Then (from Proposition 2) Φ can be substituted by∨
1≤i≤m(
∧
1≤j≤mi
([yij1]...[yijkij ])Aij), i.e., F(v)(
∨
1≤i≤m(
∧
1≤j≤mi
([yij1]...[yijkij ])
Aij)) =
∨
1≤i≤m F(v)(
∧
1≤j≤mi
([yij1]...[yijkij ])Aij) = 0,
that is, for every 1 ≤ i ≤ m, F(v)(
∧
1≤j≤mi
([yij1]...[yijkij ])Aij) = 0, i.e.
(
∧
1≤j≤mi
([yij1]...[yijkij ]Aij) ⊢ 0) ∈ T . Consequently, by applying the inference rule
2b, we deduce T  (
∨
1≤i≤m(
∧
1≤j≤mi
([yij1]...[yijkij ])Aij) ⊢ 0), that is, by the
substitution inference rule (for σ : ∨1≤i≤m(
∧
1≤j≤mi
([yij1]...[yijkij ])Aij) 7→ Φ) we
obtain that T  (Φ ⊢ 0). From the fact that 0 ⊢ Ψ is an axiom in G, and by applying
the transitive inference rule, we obtain that T  (Φ ⊢ Ψ), i.e., s ∈ C(T ) = Γv.
2.2 Case when F(v)(Φ) = 1. In this case, from the fact that this sequent is satisfied,
F(v)(Ψ) = 1 must be true as well. Thus, we can substitute Ψ by 1∨Ψ , so that we obtain
the axiom 1 ⊢ 1∨Ψ in G, and, consequently, by applying the substitution inference rule
(for σ : 1 ∨ Ψ 7→ Ψ ) we obtain T  (1 ⊢ Ψ). From the fact that Φ ⊢ 1 is an axiom
in G and by applying the transitive inference rule we obtain that T  (Φ ⊢ Ψ), i.e.,
s ∈ C(T ) = Γv .
So, from (1) and (2) we obtain that β(s) = 1 iff s ∈ Γv, i.e., the sequent
bivaluation β is the characteristic function of a closed set. Consequently, any many-
valued model v of this many-valued logic Ł corresponds to the closed bivaluation β
which is a characteristic function of a closed theory of sequents: we define the set
of all closed bivaluations obtained from the set of many-valued models v ∈ ModΓ :
BivΓ = {Γv | v ∈ ModΓ }. From the fact that Γ is satisfied by every v ∈ ModΓ we
have that for every Γv ∈ BivΓ , Γ ⊆ Γv , so that C(Γ ) =
⋂
BivΓ (an intersection of
closed sets is a closed set also). Thus, for s = (Φ ⊢ Ψ), Γ |=m s iff
∀v ∈ModΓ ( ∀(Φi ⊢ Ψi) ∈ Γ (F(v)(Φi) ≤ F(v)(Ψi)) implies F(v)(Φ) ≤ F(v)(Ψ))
iff ∀v ∈ModΓ ( ∀(Φi ⊢ Ψi) ∈ Γ (β(Φi ⊢ Ψi) = 1) implies β(Φ ⊢ Ψ) = 1)
iff ∀v ∈ModΓ ( ∀(Φi ⊢ Ψi) ∈ Γ ((Φi ⊢ Ψi) ∈ Γv) implies s ∈ Γv)
iff ∀Γv ∈ BivΓ ( Γ ⊆ Γv implies s ∈ Γv)
iff ∀Γv ∈ BivΓ ( s ∈ Γv) , because Γ ⊆ Γv for each Γv ∈ BivΓ
iff s ∈
⋂
BivΓ = C(Γ ), that is, iff Γ  s.
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Thus, in order to define the model-theoretic semantics for many-valued logics we do
not need to use the matrices: we are able to use only the many-valued valuations, and
many-valued models (i.e., the valuations which satisfy all sequents in Γ of a given
many-valued logic Ł). This point of view is used also for the definition of a new repre-
sentation theorem for many-valued complete lattice based logics in [10,7].
Here, in a many-valued logic Ł, specified by a set of sequents in Γ , for a formula φ ∈ Ł
that has the same value x ∈ X (for any truth value x) for all many-valued models
v ∈ModΓ , we have that its modal version [x]φ is a theorem; that is,
∀v ∈ModΓ (v(φ) = x) iff Γ  (1 ⊢ [x]φ),
that corresponds to the truth-invariance many-valued entailment (MV) in subsection
1.1. Such a value x ∈ X does not need to be a designated element x ∈ D, as in the
matrix semantics for a many-valued logic. This fact explains way we do not need a se-
mantic specification by matrix designated elements.
Example 2: Let us prove that, given an assumption Γ = {1 ⊢ [x]φ, 1 ⊢ [y]ψ}, then
[z](φ⊙ ψ) for z = x⊙ y, is deduced from Γ , that is Γ  ([z](φ⊙ψ)); or equivalently
if [x]φ and [y]ψ are valid (i.e., for every valuation v ∈ Vm, v : Ł → X , the values of φ
and ψ are equal to x and y respectively, i.e. ∀v ∈ Vm(v(φ) = x and v(ψ) = y)), then
[z](φ⊙ ψ) is valid as well.
As first step we introduce the equivalence relation ≡, such that Φ ≡ Ψ iff Φ ⊢ Ψ and
Ψ ⊢ Φ (i.e., when Φ iff Ψ ). Consequently, from the reflexivity axiom in G we have that
Φ ≡ Φ, as for example 1 ≡ 1. The equivalent formulae can be used in the substitution
inference rule: if Φ ≡ Ψ then we can use the substitution of Φ by Ψ , that is, the substi-
tution σ : Φ 7→ Ψ .
Let us show the simple equivalence Φ ∨ Φ ≡ Φ:
from the reflexivity axiom Φ ⊢ Φ, by using the upper bound inference rule (when
Ψ = Φ) we deduce Φ ∨ Φ ⊢ Φ. Then, from the axioms for join Φ ⊢ Φ ∨ Φ, we obtain
Φ ∨ Φ ≡ Φ.
Now, from the assumptions 1 ⊢ [x]φ, 1 ⊢ [y]ψ ∈ Γ , by the lower bound inference
rule in G, we obtain (a) 1 ⊢ [x]φ ∧ [y]ψ, i.e., Γ  (1 ⊢ [x]φ ∧ [y]ψ). Let z = x ⊙ y
and let us denote [x]φ ∧ [y]ψ) by Φ, so that (a) becomes (a’) 1 ⊢ Φ. Now we can
take the axiom for join, (b) Φ ⊢ Φ ∨ ∨v,w∈X.v⊙w=z([v]φ ∧ [w]ψ), so from (a’) and
(b) and the transitivity rule we obtain 1 ⊢ Φ ∨ ∨v,w∈X.v⊙w=z([v]φ ∧ [w]ψ), i.e., (c)
1 ⊢ Φ ∨ Φ ∨ Ψ , where Ψ =
∨
v,w∈X(v 6=x,w 6=y,v⊙w=z)([v]φ ∧ [w]ψ). Thus, by sub-
stitution σ : {1 7→ 1, Φ ∨ Φ 7→ Φ} and by applying the substitution rule to (c) we
deduce the sequent 1 ⊢ Φ ∨ Ψ , that is (d) 1 ⊢ ∨v,w∈X.v⊙w=z([v]φ ∧ [w]ψ) (from
Φ∨Ψ =
∨
v,w∈X,v⊙w=z([v]φ∧ [w]ψ)). Consequently, by applying the transitivity rule
to the sequent (d) and the introduction axiom∨v,w∈X,v⊙w=z([v]φ∧[w]ψ) ⊢ [z](φ⊙ψ),
we deduce 1 ⊢ [z](φ⊙ ψ), that is Γ  (1 ⊢ [z](φ⊙ ψ)).
Notice that in such deductions no one of the values x, y, z has to be designated value.
We do not make any distinction for the truth values in X .

Remark: There is also another way, alternative to 2-valued sequent systems, to re-
duce the many-valued logics into ”meta” 2-valued logics: it is based on Ontological
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encapsulation [22,18], where each many-valued proposition (or many-valued ground
atom p(a1, .., an)) is ontologically encapsulated into the ”flattened” 2-valued atom
pF (a1, .., an, x) (by enlarging original atoms with a new logic variable whose domain
of values is the set of truth values of the complete lattice x ∈ X : roughly, ”p(a1, .., an)
has a value x” iff pF (a1, .., an, x) is true). In fact, such a flattened atom is logically
equivalent to the sequent (1 ⊢ [x]p(a1, .., an)).
4 Autoreferential Kripke-style semantics
We are able to define an equivalence relation ≈L between the formulae of any many-
valued logic based on the set of truth values X , in order to define the Lindenbaum
algebra for this logic, (Ł/ ≈L), where for any two formulae φ, ψ ∈ Ł, φ ≈L ψ iff
∀v ∈ Vm(v(φ) = v(ψ)).
Thus, the elements of this quotient algebra Ł/ ≈L are the equivalence classes, denoted
by 〈φ〉.
In particular we will consider an equivalence class 〈φ〉 (the set of all equivalent for-
mulae to φ w.r.t. ≈L) that has exactly one constant x ∈ X , which is an element
of this equivalence class (we abuse a denotation here by denoting by x a formula,
such that has a constant logic value x ∈ X for every interpretation v, as well), and
we can use it as the representation element for this equivalence class 〈x〉. Thus, ev-
ery formula in this equivalence class has the same truth-value as this constant. Con-
sequently, we have the injection iX : X → Ł/≈L between elements in the com-
plete lattice (X,≤) and elements in the Lindenbaum algebra, such that for any logic
value x ∈ X , we obtain the equivalence class 〈x〉 = iX(x) ∈ Ł/≈L . It is easy
to extend this injection into a monomorphism between the original algebra and this
Lindenbaum algebra, by definition of correspondent connectives in this Lindenbaum
algebra. For example: 〈x ∧ y〉 = iX(x ∧ y) = iX(x) ∧L iX(y) = 〈x〉 ∧L 〈y〉,
〈¬x〉 = iX(¬x) = ¬LiX(x) = ¬L〈x〉, etc..
In an autoreferential semantics [7,8,23] we will assume that each equivalence class of
formulae 〈φ〉 in this Lindenbaum algebra corresponds to one ”state - description”. In
particular, we are interested to the subset of ”state - descriptions” that are invariant w.r.t.
many-valued interpretations v, so that can be used as the possible worlds in the Kripke-
style semantics for the original many-valued modal logic. But from the injection iX we
can take for such an invariant ”state -description” 〈x〉 ∈ Ł/≈L only its inverse image
x = i−1X (〈x〉) ∈ X .
Consequently, the set of possible worlds in this autoreferential semantics corresponds
to the set of truth values X .
Now we will consider the Kripke model (introduced in subsection 1.2) for the 2-valued
multi-modal logic language ŁM given in Definition 2, obtained from the many-valued
predicate logic language ŁP (defined at the beginning of Section 2):
Definition 7. KRIPKE SEMANTICS: Let ŁP be a many-valued predicate logic lan-
guage, based on a set X of truth values, with a set of predicate letters P and Herbrand
base H . Let Mv = (F, S, V ) be a Kripke model of its correspondent 2-valued multi-
modal logic language Ł∗M with the frame F = (W , {Rw = W × {w} | w ∈ W})
where W = X
⋃
2 and with mapping V : W × P →
⋃
n<ω2
Sn
, such that for any
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n-ary predicate p ∈ P , and tuple (c1, .., cn) ∈ Sn, there exists a unique w ∈ W , such
that V (w, p)(c1, .., cn) = 1.
It defines the Herbrand interpretation v : H → X , such that v(p(c1, .., cn)) = w iff
V (w, p)(c1, .., cn) = 1, and its unique homomorphic extension to all ground formulae
v : Ł → X .
Let g : V ar → S be an assignment for object variables νi ∈ V ar, i = 1, 2, .., and
w ∈ W , then the satisfaction relation |= is defined by Mv |=g,w φ iff v(φ/g) = w,
for any many-valued formula φ ∈ ŁP . It is extended to all modal formulae in Ł∗M as
follows:
1. Mv |=g,w 1 and Mv 2g,w 0, for tautology and contradition respectively.
2. Mv |=g,w [x]Φ iff ∀y((w, y) ∈ Rx implies Mv |=g,y Φ), for any Φ ∈ Ł∗M or
Φ ∈ ŁP .
3. Mv |=g,w Φ ∧ Ψ iff Mv |=g,w Φ and Mv |=g,w Ψ , for Φ, Ψ ∈ Ł∗M .
4. Mv |=g,w Φ ∨ Ψ iff Mv |=g,w Φ or Mv |=g,w Ψ , for Φ, Ψ ∈ Ł∗M .
Notice that, based on this Kripke model Mv, it is defined a many-valued valuation v :
H → X , with a unique standard homomorphic extension v : Ł → X , as follows from
definition above: for any ground atom p(c1, .., cn) ∈ H , we define v(p(c1, .., cn)) = w
where w ∈ X is a unique value which satisfies V (w, p)(c1, .., cn) = 1.
Vice versa, given a many-valued model v : H → X for a many-valued predicate logic
language ŁP , we define a Kripke model with mapping V such that for any w ∈ W , n-
ary p ∈ P , and a tuple (c1, .., cn) ∈ Sn, V (w, p)(c1, .., cn) = 1 iff v(p(c1, .., cn)) =
w.

Let Ψ/g ∈ ŁM be a ground formula obtained from Ψ ∈ Ł∗M by assignment g, then we
denote by ‖Ψ/g‖ the set of worlds where the ground formula Ψ/g ∈ ŁM , is satisfied,
with ‖p(ν1, .., νn)/g‖ = {v(p(g(ν1), .., g(νn)))} and ‖φ/g‖ = {v(φ/g))}, φ ∈ Ł.
Thus, differently from the original many-valued ground atoms in Ł which can be sat-
isfied only in one single world, the modal atoms in ŁM have the standard 2-valued
property, that is, they are true or false in these Kripke models, and, consequently, are
satisfiable in all possible worlds, or absolutely not satisfiable in any world. Thus, our
positive multi-modal logic with modal atoms ŁM satisfies the classic 2-valued proper-
ties:
Proposition 5 For any ground formula Φ/g of the positive multi-modal logic ŁM de-
fined in Definition 2, we have that ‖Φ/g‖ ∈ {∅,W}, where ∅ is the empty set.
Proof: By structural induction :
1. ‖1‖ =W and ‖0‖ = ∅.
2. ‖[x]φ/g‖ =W if x = v(φ/g); ∅, otherwise.
LetΦ, Ψ be the two atomic modal formulae such that, by inductive hypothesis ‖Φ/g‖, ‖Ψ/g‖ ∈
{∅,W}. Then,
3. ‖[x]Φ‖ = {w ∈ W | x ∈ ‖Φ/g‖} =W if ‖Φ/g‖ =W ; ∅ otherwise.
4. ‖(Φ ∧ Ψ)/g‖ = ‖Φ/g‖
⋂
‖Ψ/g‖ ∈ {∅,W}.
5. ‖(Φ ∨ Ψ)/g‖ = ‖Φ/g‖
⋃
‖Ψ/g‖ ∈ {∅,W}.
Thus, from the fact that any formula Φ ∈ Ł∗M is logically equivalent to disjunctive
modal formula
∨
1≤i≤m(
∧
1≤j≤mi
([yij1]...[yijkij ])Aij) (from Proposition 2), where
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each Aij ∈ H is a ground atom (such that by inductive hipothesis for any modal atom
it holds that ‖([yij1]...[yijkij ])Aij/g‖ ∈ {∅,W}), and from points 3 and 4 above, we
obtain that
‖Φ/g‖ = ‖
∨
1≤i≤m(
∧
1≤j≤mi
([yij1]...[yijkij ])Aij/g)‖ ∈ {∅,W}.

The following proposition demonstrates the existence of a one-to-one correspondence
between the unique many-valued model of a many-valued logic Ł and the Kripke model
of a multi-modal positive logic ŁM .
Proposition 6 For any many-valued formula φ/g ∈ ŁP , we have that v(φ/g) = x
iff F(v)([x]φ/g) = 1 iff ‖[x]φ/g‖ =W .
Proof: For any ground formula, we have that F(v)([x]φ/g) = 1 iff (by Proposition
1) F(v)([̂x]φ/g) = 1 iff (by Proposition 3) v(φ/g) = x.
Thus, it is enough to prove that α([̂x]φ/g) = 1 iff ‖[x]φ/g‖ =W , where α = F(v).
In the first step, proceeding from left to right, we will demonstrate it by structural in-
duction on the length (number of logic connectives) of the formula φ :
1. The simplest case when φ/g = p(c1, .., ck), ci = g(νi) ∈ S, 1 ≤ i ≤ k, is a ground
atom for the k-ary predicate letter p ∈ P . Then, if α([̂x]φ/g) = α( ̂[x]p(c1, .., ck)) =
α([x]p(c1, .., ck)) = 1, then (by Proposition 3) x = v(p(c1, .., ck)), and from Defini-
tion 7 we have that ‖[x]φ/g‖ =W .
2. Let us now suppose, by inductive hypothesis, that it holds for all formulae with N
logical connectives inΣ. Then, for any formula φ ∈ ŁP with N+1 logical connectives
we have the following two cases:
2.1. Case when φ =∼ φ1 where ∼∈ Σ is a unary connective. Then, if α([̂x]φ/g) =
(from Definition 4)= α(∨y∈X.x=∼y ̂[y]φ1/g) = (from Proposition 1)= α(
∨
y∈X.x=∼y
[y]φ1/g) = (from the homomorphism of α) =
∨
y∈X.x=∼y α([y]φ1/g) = 1. Thus,
there exists y ∈ X such that x =∼ y and α([y]φ1/g) = 1. That is, from Propo-
sition 1, α( ̂[y]φ1/g) = 1, and from the inductive hypothesis for this y we obtain (a)
‖[y]φ1/g‖ =W . So, we obtain ‖[x]φ/g‖ = ‖
∨
y∈X.x=∼y
̂[y]φ1/g‖ = (from the point
5 in Definition 7) = ⋃y∈X.x=∼y ‖[y]φ1/g‖ = (from (a)) =W .
2.2. Case when φ = φ1 ⊙ φ2, where⊙ ∈ Σ is a binary connective.
Then, if α( ̂[x](φ1 ⊙ φ2)/g) = (from Definition 4)= α(
∨
y,z∈X.x=y⊙z(
̂[y]φ1/g∧̂[z]φ2/g))
= (from Proposition 1) = α(∨y,z∈X.x=y⊙z([y]φ1/g ∧ [z]φ2/g)) = (from the homo-
morphism of α) = ∨y,z∈X.x=y⊙z(α([y]φ1/g) ∧ α([z]φ2/g)) = 1. Then, there exist
y, z ∈ X such that x = y ⊙ z with α([y]φ1/g) = 1 and α([z]φ2/g) = 1. That is, from
Proposition 1 α( ̂[y]φ1/g) = 1, α(̂[z]φ2/g) = 1, and from inductive hypothesis for this
y we obtain ‖[y]φ1/g‖ = W and ‖[z]φ2/g‖ = W , that is (b) ‖[y]φ1/g ∧ [z]φ2/g‖ =
‖[y]φ1/g‖
⋂
‖[z]φ2/g‖ = W . So, we obtain ‖[x]φ/g‖ = ‖
∨
y,z∈X.x=y⊙z(
̂[y]φ1/g ∧
̂[z]φ2/g)‖ = (from the point 5 in Definition 7) =
⋃
y,z∈X.x=y⊙z ‖[y]φ1/g∧[z]φ2/g‖ =
(from (a)) =W .
Consequently, we have shown that α([̂x]φ/g) = 1 implies ‖[x]φ/g‖ = W . Vice
versa, the proof from right to left is analogous.
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Let us show now that for any ground formula Φ/g ∈ ŁM it holds that α(Φ/g) = 1 iff
‖Φ/g‖ =W :
From the fact that any Φ ∈ ŁM is logically equivalent to disjunctive modal formula∨
1≤i≤m(
∧
1≤j≤mi
([yij1]...[yijkij ])Aij), we obtain that if,
α(Φ/g) = α(
∨
1≤i≤m(
∧
1≤j≤mi
([yij1]...[yijkij ])Aij/g)) =
=
∨
1≤i≤m(
∧
1≤j≤mi
α(([yij1 ]...[yijkij ])Aij/g)) = 1,
then there exists i, (1 ≤ i ≤ m), such that for all 1 ≤ j ≤ mi,α(([yij1]...[yijkij ])Aij/g) =
1, i.e., ‖([yij1]...[yijkij ])Aij/g‖ = W . Thus, ‖
∧
1≤j≤mi
([yij1]...[yijkij ])Aij/g‖ =⋂
1≤j≤mi
‖([yij1]...[yijkij ])Aij/g) ‖ =W , and consequently, ‖Φ/g‖ =W .
And vice versa.

Corollary 1 Given a many-valued model v for a many-valued logic language ŁP , for
any ground formula Φ/g ∈ ŁM holds that F(v)(Φ/g) = 1 iff ‖Φ/g‖ = W , (i.e.,
Φ/g is true in the Kripke model in Definition 7).
Proof: By structural recursion and by Propositions 5 and 6.

From this corollary we obtain that any true formula Φ ∈ ŁM is true also in the Kripke
model, and vice versa. That is, the autoreferential Kripke-stile semantics for the multi-
modal logic ŁM , defined in Definition 7, is sound and complete.
5 Conclusion
The main goal of this paper has been the development of a new binary sequent calculi,
with truth-invariance entailment, for a many-valued predicate logic language ŁP with a
finite set of truth valuesX , and the definition of Kripke-like semantics for it, both sound
and complete. We did not use any ordering of truth values inX nor any algebraic matrix
with a strict subset of designated truth values. So, from this point of view, it is the most
general semantic approach for the many-valued logics. In more specific cases, when the
set X is a complete lattice of truth values, there is also another non-matix based ap-
proach (with truth-preserving entailment) presented in [7,10] where the sequent system
is based on the lattice poset of truth values.
In comparison with the standard historical approach based on m-sequents, this approach
is deterministic, in the way that the axiomatic sequent system is uniquely determined
by the set of many-valued logical connectives. It is more compact and is a particular
implementation of standard two-sided sequent systems, where the left side of each se-
quent is just a single formula, as well. Moreover, it is not matrix-based and does need
any definition of a subset of designated elements inX , as in other approaches where for
each subjectively defined subset of designated truth values (consider for example the
logic with n = 1030 truth-values, X = { in | 1 ≤ i ≤ n}), for the same logic language
Ł and the same semantics for its logical connectives, we obtain the different deductive
system. Here this subjectiveness is avoided, based on the generalization of the 2-valued
truth-invariance principle for the logic entailment, and the resulting deductive system
for a many-valued logic with fixed semantics of its logical connectives is general and
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uniquely defined as in all cases of the 2-valued logics.
Differently from other approaches we defined also a Kripke-like semantics for this
many-valued deductive system, because our encapsulation of many-valued logic into
the 2-valued sequent system is based on the introduction of the finite set of modal oper-
ators, for each truth value in X , that is, this 2-valued encapsulation is modal as in [18].
The frame in this autoreferential Kripke semantics, based on the Lindenbaum algebra
considerations, is finite and uniquely determined by the set of truth values in X .
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